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Custer County Case CV-2012-56
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Appealed from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District
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Jeffrey Brownson
ISBA# 7474
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83 701
Phone:(208)343-1000
Facsimile: (208) 345-8274
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
MARC EDWARD KLEIN,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2012-56

NOTICE OF FILING
EXHIBITS

---------------------------- )
The Petitioner, Marc Klein, through his attorneys, submits the attached exhibits from the
underlying criminal case (CR-20 10-729) for the Court to take judicial notice of in the above
referenced civil post-conviction case.
Please find the following attached:

11- Affidavit ofProbable Cause (11112110);
12 - Criminal Complaint (1111211 0);

J3- Minute Entry for Felony First Appearance (1 1112110);
14- Minute Entry for Preliminary Hearing (I 112211 0);
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J5- Minute Entry for Preliminary Hearing (12113/10);
J6- Exhibit List (12113110);
J7- State's Exhibit's A, B, & C (12113110);

J8 - Order Binding-Defendant Over and Order Setting Time

fo~

Arraignment (12/1311 0);

J9 - Criminal Information (12114/1 0);
110- Minute Entry for Pretrial Conference (12/17/2010);
111 - Judgment of Conviction & Order of Commitment (4/22/11 );
112- Motion for Rule 35 (6/27111);
113- Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea and Affidavit (6/27111);
114 - Objection to Motion for Sentence Reduction and to Withdraw Guilty Plea (7/14/11 );
115 - Brief in Support of Objection to Motion for Sentence Reduction and to Withdraw
Guilty Plea (7/14/11 );
J16- Minute Entry & Order (7/25111);
117 - Order Denying Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea (8/8111 ); and
J 18 - Order Denying Motion to Sentence Reduction (8/8111 ).
DATED this

2 •

_rl day of July, 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on this~ day of July, 2012, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing document to be:

_K__ mailed
faxed
hand delivered
to:
Val Siegel, Custer County Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 630, Challis, ID 83226
Honorable Joel E. Tingey, Bonneville County Courthouse, 605 N. Capital Ave., Idaho Falls, ID
83402

JeffrW¢ns~
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
MARC EDWARD KLEIN,
Petitioner,

Case No. CV-2012-056

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

MEMORANDUM
DECISION AND ORDER ON MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT,
SUMMARY DISMISSAL

THIS MATTER is before the Court the State's motion for summary dismissal,
and Petitioner Marc Klein's (Klein) motion for summary judgment. Following the
hearing on the motions, the Court took the motions under advisement. In ruling on these
motions, the Court has considered the record in this matter which includes exhibits from
the underlying criminal action which were admitted into evidence.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 11, 2010, Klein. was involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting

in the death of Jory Twitchell. Klein's blood toxicology following the accident indicated
a BAC of .279. In Custer County case CR-2010-709, Klein was charged with vehicular
manslaughter and excessive driving under the influence of alcohol. An accident report
was prepared by Idaho State Police corporal Allen Bivins, wherein Bivins concluded that
as the two vehicles approached each other on Highway 93 from opposite directions, Klein
failed to yield the right of way, and instead turned left and crossed the center line in front
of Twitchell resulting in a near head-on collision.
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Bivins' report was prepared on November 18,2010 and Bivins testified at the
preliminary hearing on December 13,2010. Bivins' report was reviewed and approved by
Idaho State Police Officer Fred Rice, who also prepared his own report on February 2,
2011.
On February 16, 2011, the Parties entered into a plea agreement whereby Klein
would plead guilty to vehicular manslaughter and the charge of excessive DUI would be
dismissed. The State also agreed to recommend at the time of sentencing a six year
sentence: three years fixed and three years indeterminate. On February 16, 20 II, Klein
entered an Alford plea of guilty to the charge of vehicular manslaughter and a Judgment
of Conviction was entered on February 22, 2011. On June 27, 2011, Klein filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On August 8, 2011, the court denied the motion for
lack of jurisdiction.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A petition filed under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act (UPCP A), I. C.

§ 19-4901 et. seq., initiates a new civil proceeding distinct from the underlying criminal
conviction. Nguyen v. State, 126 Idaho 494, 887 P.2d 39 (Ct. App. 1994). Like a plaintiff
in a civil action, the applicant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence the
allegations upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. I.C. § 19-4907;
Russel v. State, 118 Idaho 65, 67, 794 P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App. 1990).

Although a proceeding under the UPCPA is civil in nature, the petition for postconviction relief differs from the complaint in an ordinary civil action in that it must be
verified with respect to the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner, and
supported by affidavits, records, or other evidence attached to the petition, or the petition
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must state why supporting evidence is not attached. I. C. §19-4903. Stated otherwise, the
petition must contain or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its
allegations or it is subject to dismissal. Small v. State, 132 Idaho 327, 331, 971 P.2d
1151, 1155 (Ct. App. 1998). The petitioner must make a factual showing based on
admissible evidence that he is entitled to relief. !d. Bare or conclusory allegations,
unsubstantiated by any admissible fact, are inadequate to afford relief. !d.
An order for summary disposition of a post-conviction relief application under

I.C. § 19-4906(c) is the procedural equivalent of summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56.

Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000). Summary dismissal of a postconviction application is appropriate only if no genuine issue of material fact exists
which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. If a
genuine factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v.

State, 120 Idaho 759, 763,819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct.App.1991); Hoover v. State, 114
Idaho 145, 754 P.2d 458 (Ct.App.1988).
In determining a motion for summary disposition, the district court reviews the
facts in the light most favorable to the petitioner and determines whether the facts would
entitle petitioner to relief if accepted as true. Pratt, 134 Idaho at 583, 6 P.3d at 833. A
petition for post-conviction relief will be subject to summary dismissal if the petitioner
has not presented evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element upon which
the applicant bears the burden of proof. /d. Summary dismissal of an application for
post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the state does not
controvert the applicant's evidence because the court is not required to accept either the
applicant's mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the
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applicant's conclusions oflaw. Cowger v State, 132 Idaho 681, 684, 978 P.2d 241, 244
(Ct. App. 1999); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994);

Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986).
Post-conviction petitions are not substitutes for appeals, and applicants may not
raise issues in post-conviction petitions that could have been raised on direct appeal
unless the issues were not known and could not reasonably have been known during the
direct appeal. I.C. § 19-4901(b); Raudebaugh v. State, 135 Idaho 602, 21 P.3d 924 (App.
2001); Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581, 976 P.2d 927, 935 (1999); Rogers v. State,
129 Idaho 720,932 P.2d 348 (1997).
As to claims based upon an alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the
petitioner bears the burden of proving that (1) the attorney was incompetent and/or his or
her conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for the
incompetence, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different. Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Fodge v. State, 125
Idaho 882, 876 P.2d 164 (App. 1994).

III. ANALYSIS
In his Petition, Klein seeks relief under three theories or claims. First, Klein
argues that there was a Brady violation in the criminal proceedings as to the credibility of
Fred Rice, and but for the Brady violation, Klein would not have pleaded guilty. Second,
Klein asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective in not properly investigating the
accident and obtaining "independent'' expert analysis as to the cause ofthe subject
accident which also would have precluded a guilty plea. Third, Klein contends his trial
counsel was ineffective in not timely moving to withdraw Klein's guilty plea.
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As indicated above, the Parties have essentially filed cross motions for summary
judgment. The state seeks dismissal of all of Klein's claims. Klein argues he is entitled
to summary judgment as to the first and third claims.
A. Alleged Brady violation
Generally, in a criminal proceeding the state has the obligation to disclose to the
defendant all exculpatory information:
Due process requires all material exculpatory evidence known to the State
or in its possession be disclosed to the defendant. Brady v. Maryland, 3 73
U.S. 83,83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho
24, 27, 995 P.2d 794, 797 (2000). "[T]here is 'no constitutional
requirement that the prosecutor make a complete and detailed accounting
to defense of all police investigatory work on a case.' " State v. Horn, 101
Idaho 192, 195, 610 P.2d 551,554 (1980)(quoting Moore v. Illinois, 408
U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L.Ed.2d 706, 713 (1972)). "There
are three essential components of a true Brady violation: the evidence at
issue must be favorable to the accused, either because it is exculpatory, or
because it is impeaching; that evidence must have been suppressed by the
State, either willfully or inadvertently; and prejudice must have
ensued." Strickler v. Greene,527 U.S. 263,263, 119 S.Ct. 1936, 1939, 144
L.Ed.2d 286,291 (1999). Impeachment evidence should be viewed in the
same manner as exculpatory evidence. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.
667, 676, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3380, 87 L.Ed.2d 481,490 (1985); Pizzuto v.
State, 134 Idaho 793, 796, 10 P.3d 742, 745 (2000). However, the United
States Constitution does not require the State to disclose material
impeachment information prior to entering a plea agreement with the
defendant. United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 629, 633, 122 S.Ct. 2450,
2455, 2457, 153 L.Ed.2d 586, 595, 597 (2002). One of the reasons behind
the Court's holding is that "impeachment information is special in relation
to the fairness ofa trial not in respect to whether a plea
is voluntary[.]" Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 629, 122 S.Ct. at 2455, 153 L.Ed.2d at
595.

Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 64, 106 P.3d 376, 390 (2004).
Klein asserts that the State failed to disclose evidence that Rice had previously
testified inconsistently as to factors applicable in an accident reconstruction and that Rice
therefore lacked credibility. The impetus for this argument arises from the decision in

208

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

5

State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 57, 253 P.3d 727, 731 (2011 ), which was entered on
May 27, 2011.
In Ellington, the defendant was charged with second degree murder with regard to
Ellington striking an individual with his vehicle. Fred Rice performed an accident
reconstruction and testified on behalf of the state. Fallowing his conviction, Ellington
moved for a new trial on the grounds that Rice had committed perjury. The Court noted
Rice's testimony as follows:
At trial, the State called reconstruction expert and Idaho State Police Cpl.
Fred Rice to the stand to rebut testimony offered by Dr. William Skelton,
Jr., regarding average perception and reaction times and using crash debris
to locate a point of impact. Dr. Skelton testified as an accident
reconstructionist expert for the defense, and stated that there was an
average perception-reaction time of 1.5 seconds and that crash debris from
the accident could be used to locate where the vehicle was on the road.
This average perception-reaction time took into account that it takes .75
seconds to perceive the hazard and . 75 seconds to react to the hazard. He
concluded based on those facts and his reconstruction both that Mr.
Ellington did not have the time to react to avoid hitting either the Honda or
Mrs. Larsen, and that the debris field in the westbound lane indicated that
Mr. Ellington was traveling in the correct, eastbound, lane of travel when
the Blazer and the Honda collided.
During Cpl. Rice's rebuttal testimony, he stated that Dr. Skelton's 1.5
second reaction time could not be used because ''there is no average
perception reaction time in the world." He also testified that a debris field
is not reliable in placing a vehicle at the scene because "debris can be
moved, kicked around, like I said, it sprays" and that the debris field was
"not going to tell me where the point of impact happened."
After the trial, Mr. Ellington filed a motion for new trial on the grounds
that he had discovered new evidence that Cpl. Rice had testified
inconsistently for the State in a vehicle-pedestrian collision case in the
district court of Elmore County called State v. Ciccone, in January of
2005. In that case, Cpl. Rice testified that the location of the crash debris
in the form of glass "definitely coincides with where the impact point is."
Mr. Ellington also submitted evidence that the training materials Cpl. Rice
teaches from, which he prepared himself, state that the average perceptionreaction time is 1.6 seconds.FN17 Cpl. Rice testified in the Ciccone
preliminary hearing that he had used a reaction time, which he clarified
209
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was only the time to react and did not include the time to perceive, of 0. 75
seconds, supporting the testimony here of Dr. Skelton.
151 Idaho at 71-72.

The Supreme Court's opinion of Rice's testimony was not flattering:
Further, the newly-discovered evidence provides very compelling
evidence that Cpl. Rice perjured himself during the Ellington trial.
It is extremely disturbing to this Court that an officer of the law would
present false testimony in any case, especially a murder case. In this case,
however, it is impossible to believe there was any truth to the testimony of
Cpl. Rice. It is abhorrent to this Court, as it would be to any other court,
that a man can be sentenced to twenty-five years for second-degree
murder based primarily on the false testimony of a trooper of this State.
!d. at 76.
It is the Court's opinion that Klein's claim of a Brady violation fails for at least
two reasons. First, the record reflects that the State relied on the report of Officer Bivins
who also testified at the time of the preliminary hearing. Bivins' report and conclusions
should not be considered tainted simply because they were reviewed by Rice. While
Klein may disagree with Bivens' conclusions, there is no evidence of Bivins giving false
or inconsistent testimony.
Furthermore, in contrast to Ellington, there was no jury verdict and Rice did not
provide any testimony. There is no evidence that Rice's relatively limited involvement in
this matter would be directly impeachable, as opposed to simply arguing that he has
previously testified inconsistently. For example, in Ellington the Court found that the
"false testimony" of Rice related to his rebuttal testimony discounting the application of a
standard reaction time and the use of a debris field to identifY a point of impact. There is
no evidence in this case that Rice's conclusions in his report were based on the same type
of false opinions as highlighted in Ellington. Accordingly, the Court finds that any
210
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historical problems with Rice's credibility were too attenuated to have a real or
meaningful effect on the voluntariness of Klein's Alford plea.
Additionally and perhaps more importantly, Brady violations in the nature of
impeachment evidence cannot occur in the context of plea agreements or a guilty plea. In
reversing a decision from the 9th Circuit, the U.S. Supreme Court held as follows:
In this case, the Ninth Circuit in effect held that a guilty plea is not
"voluntary" (and that the defendant could not, by pleading guilty, waive
her right to a fair trial) unless the prosecutors first made the same
disclosure of material impeachment information that the prosecutors
would have had to make had the defendant insisted upon a trial. We must
decide whether the Constitution requires that preguilty plea disclosure of
impeachment information. We conclude that it does not.
First, impeachment information is special in relation to the fairness of a
trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary ("knowing,"
"intelligent," and "sufficient[ly] aware"). Of course, the more information
the defendant has, the more aware he is of the likely consequences of a
plea, waiver, or decision, and the wiser that decision will likely be. But the
Constitution does not require the prosecutor to share all useful information
with the defendant. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559, 97 S.Ct.
83 7, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 ( 1977) ("There is no general constitutional right to
discovery in a criminal case"). And the law ordinarily considers a waiver
knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware ifthe defendant fully
understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply in
general in the circumstances-even though the defendant may not know the
specific detailed consequences of invoking it. A defendant, for example,
may waive his right to remain silent, his right to a jury trial, or his right to
counsel even if the defendant does not know the specific questions the
authorities intend to ask, who will likely serve on the jury, or the particular
lawyer the State might otherwise provide. Cf. Colorado v. Spring, 4 79
U.S. 564, 573-575, 107 S.Ct. 851,93 L.Ed.2d 954 (1987) (Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination waived when defendant
received standard Miranda warnings regarding the nature of the right but
not told the specific interrogation questions to be asked).
It is particularly difficult to characterize impeachment information as
critical information of which the defendant must always be aware prior to
pleading guilty given the random way in which such information may, or
may not, help a particular defendant. The degree of help that impeachment
information can provide will depend upon the defendant's own
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independent knowledge of the prosecution's potential case-a matter that
the Constitution does not require prosecutors to disclose.
Second, we have found no legal authority embodied either in this Court's
past cases or in cases from other circuits that provides significant support
for the Ninth Circuit's decision. To the contrary, this Court has found that
the Constitution, in respect to a defendant's awareness of relevant
circumstances, does not require complete knowledge of the relevant
circumstances, but permits a court to accept a guilty plea, with its
accompanying waiver of various constitutional rights, despite various
forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might labor. See
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S., at 757, 90 S.Ct. 1463 (defendant
"misapprehended the quality ofthe State's case"); ibid. (defendant
misapprehended "the likely penalties"); ibid. (defendant failed to
"anticipate" a change in the law regarding relevant "punishments");
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763
(1970) (counsel "misjudged the admissibility" of a "confession"); United
States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 573, 109 S.Ct. 757, 102 L.Ed.2d 927 (1989)
(counsel failed to point out a potential defense); Tollett v. Henderson, 411
U.S. 258,267,93 S.Ct. 1602,36 L.Ed.2d 235 (1973) (counsel failed to
find a potential constitutional infirmity in grand jury proceedings). It is
difficult to distinguish, in terms of importance, (1) a defendant's ignorance
of grounds for impeachment of potential witnesses at a possible future trial
from (2) the varying forms of ignorance at issue in these cases.
Third, due process considerations, the very considerations that led this
Court to find trial-related rights to exculpatory and impeachment
information in Brady and Giglio, argue against the existence of the "right"
that the Ninth Circuit found here. This Court has said that due process
considerations include not only (1) the nature of the private interest at
stake, but also (2) the value of the additional safeguard, and (3) the
adverse impact of the requirement upon the Government's interests. Ake v.
Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77, 105 S.Ct. 1087, 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985). Here,
as we have just pointed out, the added value of the Ninth Circuit's ''right"
to a defendant is often limited, for it depends upon the defendant's
independent awareness of the details ofthe Government's case. And in any
case, as the proposed plea agreement at issue here specifies, the
Government will provide "any information establishing the factual
innocence of the defendant" regardless. That fact, along with other guiltyplea safeguards, see Fed. Rule Crim. Proc. 11, diminishes the force of
Ruiz's concern that, in the absence of impeachment information, innocent
individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty. Cf. McCarthy v. United
States, 394 U.S. 459,465-467, 89 S.Ct. 1166,22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969)
(discussing Rule ll's role in protecting a defendant's constitutional rights).
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At the same time, a constitutional obligation to provide impeachment
information during plea bargaining, prior to entry of a guilty plea, could
seriously interfere with the Government's interest in securing those guilty
pleas that are factually justified, desired by defendants, and help to secure
the efficient administration of justice. The Ninth Circuit's rule risks
premature disclosure of Government witness information, which, the
Government tells us, could "disrupt ongoing investigations" and expose
prospective witnesses to serious harm.
Consequently, the Ninth Circuit's requirement could force the Government
to abandon its "general practice" of not "disclos[ing] to a defendant
pleading guilty information that would reveal the identities of cooperating
informants, undercover investigators, or other prospective witnesses."
Brief for United States 25. It could require the Government to devote
substantially more resources to trial preparation prior to plea bargaining,
thereby depriving the plea-bargaining process of its main resource-saving
advantages. Or it could lead the Government instead to abandon its heavy
reliance upon plea bargaining in a vast number-90% or more-of federal
criminal cases. We cannot say that the Constitution's due process
requirement demands so radical a change in the criminal justice process in
order to achieve so comparatively small a constitutional benefit.
These considerations, taken together, lead us to conclude that the
Constitution does not require the Government to disclose material
impeachment evidence prior to entering a plea agreement with a criminal
defendant.

US. v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628-633, 122 S.Ct. 2450, 2455-2457 (2002)(emphasis
added).
There can be no genuine dispute that evidence relating to Rice's credibility is
impeachment evidence only.
Unlike substantive evidence which is offered for the purpose of
persuading the trier of fact as to the truth of a proposition on which the
determination of the tribunal is to be asked, impeachment is that which is
designed to discredit a witness, i.e. to reduce the effectiveness of his
testimony by bringing forth the evidence which explains why the jury
should not put faith in him or his testimony. Examples of impeachment
evidence would include prior inconsistent statements, bias, attacks on [the]
character of a witness, prior felony convictions, and attacks on the
capacity of the witness to observe, recall or relate.

State v. Marsh, 141 Idaho 862, 868-69, 119 P.3d 637, 643-44 (App.2004).
213
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Accordingly, there was no constitutional requirement to disclose Rice's prior
inconsistent testimony. The Court finds that Klein is not entitled to summary judgment
on this issue, but rather the State is entitled to summary dismissal.
B. Ineffective Counsel - Withdrawing Guilty Plea.
In asserting ineffective counsel, a petitioner must prove that the conduct of trial
counsel fell below the applicable standard of care and that the petitioner was prejudiced
thereby:
Our Court adopted the Strickland two-prong test to evaluate whether a
criminal defendant received effective assistance of counsel. Mathews, 133
Idaho at 306, 986 P.2d at 329; Wood, 132 Idaho at 95, 967 P.2d at
709;Giles v. State, 125 Idaho 921, 924, 877 P.2d 365, 368 (1994). A
defendant must prove that counsel's performance was deficient and the
deficiency prejudiced the case. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at
2064,80 L.Ed.2d at 693; Mathews, 133 Idaho at 306, 986 P.2d at
329;Wood, 132 Idaho at 95-96,967 P.2d at 709-10. To show a deficiency
the defendant must show the attorney's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness. Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho
76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002). To prove prejudice, the defendant must
show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient
performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Id. When
the conviction is the result of a plea as compared to a trial; "the defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d
203,210 (1985).

Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59, 106 P.3d 376,385 (2004).
The record reflects that once the Supreme Court entered its decision in Ellington
finding that Rice had provided false testimony, trial counsel sought to withdraw Klein's
plea. However, the trial court ruled that the motion was not timely since it was filed after
the time within which Klein could appeal the judgment of conviction. Specifically, the
last day for appeal was June 3, 2011 and the motion was not filed until June 27, 2011. As
argued by Klein at the time of the hearing this matter, trial counsel should have been
214
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aware ofthe Ellington decision filed on May 27, 2011 giving trial counsel a seven day
window to timely file the motion to withdraw the plea. While there is no dispute that the
motion was untimely, the issue is whether trial counsel's failure to file a timely motion
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
There is no allegation or basis to conclude that trial counsel should have
previously been aware of Rice's inconsistent testimony as noted by the Supreme Court in
Ellington. Instead, Klein's bare allegation is that trial counsel should have been aware of
the Ellington decision, and correspondingly the credibility issue with Rice, within seven
days ofthe ofthe Supreme Court's decision. 1 However, there is no evidence to support a
claim that a failure to review and understand the significance of the Ellington decision
within seven days of its issuance fell below an objective standard of care. On the
contrary, it would seem unreasonable to this Court to impose a duty on attorneys to fully
educate themselves on each new decision issued by an appellate court within seven days.

2

In any event, the record in this case does not support imposing such a duty.
Klein has not shown that trial counsel's failure to timely file a motion to withdraw
Klein's guilty plea fell below an objective standard. As such, Klein has failed to satisfY
the first prong of the Strickland standard. This Court need not address the second prong
i.e., whether a timely motion to withdraw would have been granted.
C. Ineffective Assistance- investigation of the accident.
Klein argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in not conducting more of an
investigation into the accident and retaining a separate expert to perform an accident
reconstruction. The State seeks summary dismissal of this claim.
1

Not counting the time necessruy to prepare and file the motion to withdraw the guilty plea.
Whether trial counsel took 8 days or longer to become aware of the Ellington decision is irrelevant since
the result would be the same.
2
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The record reflects that trial counsel did investigate the conclusions of the
investigating officers as to the cause ofthe accident and determined not to retain a
different expert witness to perform an accident reconstruction. Klein has produced
evidence that other accident reconstructionists were available and that one
reconstructionist, Dave Jakovac P.E., reached conclusions different from Bivins (and
Rice) and could have provided testimony favorable to Klein.
Trial counsel is entitled to a strong presumption that his" ... performance was
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance-that is, sound trial strategy."

Hoffman v. State, 277 P.3d 1050, 1054-1055 (Idaho App.,2012). See also Huckv. State,
124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634,637 (App.1993). Notwithstanding this presumption, it
is the Court's opinion that there are disputed issues of fact as to the investigation
performed by trial counsel and whether that investigation complied with the applicable
standard. As such summary dismissal is not appropriate at this time.
In reaching this conclusion, it is not the Court's opinion that trial counsel was
automatically obligated to retain an accident reconstructionist. A number of factors
would go into that decision such as availability, cost effectiveness, as well as an analysis
of the case against Klein. While the record contains some evidence as to the trial
counsel's investigation and thought processes, the Court believes that in light of the
disputed facts, more of a record is required as to the steps taken by trial counsel (in
consultation with Klein) to investigate and rebut the State's case as to the cause of the
accident. The Court will require an evidentiary hearing on this issue.

IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
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Based on the foregoing, Klein's motion for summary judgment is denied. The
State's motion for summary dismissal is granted in part and denied in part, consistent
with the foregoing.
/

Dated this 1§_ day of August, 2012.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
/

I hereby certify that on this __l_j___ day of August, 2012, I did send a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse
mailbox; or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Jeffrey Brownson
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
Val Siegel
Custer County Pros. Atty
P.O. Box 630
Challis, ID 83226
BARBARA TIERNEY
Clerk of the District Court
Custer County, Idaho
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Val Siegel, ISB No. 3749
Custer County Prosecuting Attorney
521 Main Street
P.O. Box 630
Challis, ID 83226
Telephone: 208-879-4383
Facsimile: 208-879-2498

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
MARC EDWARD KLEIN,
Petitioner,

v.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Respondent.
__________________________
)

Case No. CV-2012-56

RESPONDENT'S POST-TRIAL
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

COMES NOW Val Siegel, Custer County Prosecuting Attorney and attorney for the
Respondent, and submits this post-trial memorandum in opposition to the petition for postconviction relief filed herein. The Court has previously granted the respondent's motion
for summary disposition upon the first and third claims for relief asserted in that petition.
On February 15, 2013 a trial was held upon the second asserted claim that the petitioner's
trial counsel Justin Oleson provided ineffective assistance of counsel by conducting an
inadequate investigation, primarily by failing to retain a defense expert to investigate the
cause of the crash that killed Jory Twitchell on November 11, 2010. The Court has
requested post-trial briefing.
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LEGAL AUTHORITIES
In order to prevail upon his petition for post-conviction relief, the petitioner must
prove his allegations by a preponderance of evidence. Russell v State, 118 Idaho 65; 794
P.2d 654, 656 (Ct. App., 1992). In order to prevail upon a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel specifically, he must show that Mr. Oleson's investigation was both deficient and
that he was prejudiced thereby. The petitioner must overcome a strong presumption that
Mr. Oleson's investigation was adequate by proving that it did not meet objective standards
of competence. He must then prove that there is a reasonable probability but for Mr.
Oleson's allegedly unprofessional investigation the defendant would not have pled guilty.
A determination of "reasonable probability'' does not entail "a subjective investigation into
what the particular defendant and his counsel would actually have decided, but an objective
assessment" of all of the evidence in the case as well as "other motivations for pleading
guilty" such as a favorable plea agreement.
In determining the probable effect of the undisclosed information on
the plea decision, however, we must consider not only the potential
exculpatory value of the evidence but also whether the defendant had
motivations for pleading guilty that are apparent from the record
other than the weight of the evidence against him. Any benefit
derived by the defendant from the guilty plea is a significant factor
inasmuch as a plea may be heavily motivated by reduction of
exposure to additional charges and criminal penalties. This
consideration is quite independent of the weight of the evidence on
the charge to which the guilty plea was entered. State v Gardner,
126 Idaho 428; 885 P.2d 1144 (1994).

Mr. Oleson was charged with giving the petitioner a "candid estimate of the probable

outcome" of a trial, but "the decisions concerning what pleas to enter and whether to accept
a plea agreement are ultimately for the accused." Standard 4-5.1 and 4-5.2 of ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice: Defense Function. The test for judging whether counsel
was ineffective is whether he so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial
process that the petitioner's guilty plea can not be regarded as having produced a just
outcome. Strickland vWashington, 466 U.S. 668: 104 S.Ct. 2052; 80 L.Ed.2d 674
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(1984). Hill v Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52; 106 S.Ct. 366; 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). Roman v

State, 125 Idaho 644; 873 P.2d 898 (Ct.App. 1994).
In judging the reasonableness of Mr. Oleson's investigation, the reviewing Court is

charged with being deferential to trial counsel, with ignoring the benefits of hindsight in
criticizing his conduct, and with attempting to evaluate that conduct in light of his
perspective at the time and the circumstances then existing. The Court must indulge the
presumption that his representation of the petitioner was adequate, that it fell within the
wide range of professionally competent assistance, and that his decisions were made in the
exercise of reasonable professional judgment. State v Matthews, 133 Idaho 300; 986 P.2d
323 (1999). In Murphy v State, 143 Idaho 139; 139 P.3d 741 (Ct.App. 2006) the Court
applied these principles to trial counsel's duty to consult and retain experts:
It is well established that, in reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, the Court will not attempt to second-guess trial counsel's strategic
decisions unless those decisions are made upon the basis of inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the law, or other shortcomings .... Strategic choices
made after incomplete investigations are reasonable if reasonable professional
judgments support the limitations on investigation .... The duty to investigate
requires only that counsel conduct a reasonable investigation .... A defendant's
lawyer does not always have a duty to consult experts when the government is
proposing to put on expert witnesses. There may be no reason to question the
validity of the government's proposed evidence.... " (Emphasis added.) In
assessing the reasonableness of counsel's investigation, we consider... whether
the known evidence would lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further.
Murphy, supra.

ISSUES
I.

Given the circumstances existing at the time, was Mr. Oleson's investigation,
including most specifically his decision not to retain an accident reconstructionist, so
deficient as to fall outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance,
undermining the proper functioning of the adversarial process, and rendering the
petitioner's guilty plea unjust?

II.

If Mr. Oleson's investigation was constitutionally deficient, is there a reasonable
probability that the petitioner would not have pled guilty based upon an objective
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assessment of all of the evidence in the case and his other motivations for pleading
guilty but for that deficiency?
The Respondent would argue that the answers to these questions is undoubtedly "no."

ARGUMENT
I.

Mr. Oleson testified at the post-conviction trial that he felt that Allen Bivins, the
respondent's first accident reconstructionist, was not particularly convincing either in his
written report (petitioner's Exhibit 3) or at the petitioner's preliminary hearing and
suggested consulting with an independent expert. Fred Rice, the respondent's second
accident reconstructionist, conducted a subsequent investigation and submitted his own
written report (petitioner's Exhibit 2) which Mr. Oleson also reviewed. Both Idaho State
Police reconstructionists concluded that the crash occurred when the petitioner crossed into
the victim's lane of travel and ran into him. Mr. Oleson testified that he had confidence in
Mr. Rice because of a prior case of vehicular manslaughter in which Mr. Rice had

contradicted the State's other reconstructionist and concluded that Mr. Oleson's client was
not the driver. The client was acquitted. Mr. Oleson testified that he contacted Mr. Rice
concerning the case at bar and spoke with him about the evidence and the latter's
conclusions. He testified that Mr. Rice was able to explain his conclusions in a manner
that made sense to him. Mr. Oleson testified that he compiled a list of three to four
independent reconstructionists and spoke with at least one of them personally. He was able
to identify billing statements which he believes document his conversation with the
independent reconstructionist. Mr. Oleson testified that he discussed the case and the
details of the crash with this reconstructionist ("I gave him as much information as
possible"), went through the Bivins and Rice reports with him, and even discussed the cost
of retention. Mr. Oleson testified that this reconstructionist told him that it would be a
waste of time to attempt to rebut Mr. Rice.
Mr. Oleson testified that he spoke with the petitioner about the Bivins and the Rice
reports, and about his conversations with Rice and the independent reconstructionist. "I
ST. v.KLEIN
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remember telling (the petitioner) that we could find an expert (to rebut Rice) if we paid
enough money. I told (the petitioner) what the cost would be." Mr. Oleson testified that "if
(the petitioner) had wanted to do it (retain a reconstructionist), he had the ability to pay."
Mr. Oleson testified that he and the petitioner discussed the problems with their case and

with the State's case, the pros and cons of going to trial, and what the respondent would
have to prove. There were many problems with the petitioner's case beyond simply the
Bivins and Rice reports. There were gouges on the roadway in Mr. Twitchell's lane,
ostensibly made by his vehicle upon impact, and an oil trail leading from that location to
his vehicle's final resting place. Custer County Deputy Sheriff Mike Talbot's incident
report previously filed and entered into evidence pursuant to affidavit on July 5, 2012 as
respondent's Exhibit 7 establishes that a witness stated that Mr. Twitchell had passed him a
short time before the crash occurred, was driving safely, and was not speeding. The
petitioner's BAC was .279 and he claims that he can not remember the accident although
he made statements that he hit Mr. Twitchell. Mr. Oleson testified that he rarely tells a
client that he should not go to trial. "That is his choice." Mr. Oleson testified that the
petitioner decided that he did not want to retain an expert, that he wanted to plead guilty,
that he wanted out of the Custer County jail as soon as possible, and that he wanted to
accept the respondent's plea offer whereby it agreed to recommend a six (6) year unified
sentence instead of the fifteen (15) year maximum allowed by the statute. The petitioner
himself testified that he thought that offer was fair.

It is hard for the respondent to fathom how Mr. Oleson's failure to retain an
independent expert, to personally examine the vehicles in question, to delve into their
history, or to take photographs or measurements at the scene could possibly be viewed as
conduct so deficient as to fall outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance, undermining the proper functioning of the adversarial process, and rendering the
petitioner's guilty plea unjust. Mr. Oleson testified that he did everything the petitioner
requested he do. The petitioner testified that he himself told the trial judge at the time he
entered his guilty plea that Mr. Oleson had done "everything I requested." The record in
this case establishes that Mr. Twitchell's vehicle was not available to examine even if Mr.
ST. v. KLEIN
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Oleson had wanted to do so. Mr. Oleson candidly admitted that he knows little about
automobiles and so would not have known what to look for if he had conducted an
examination. He already had photographs and measurements of the vehicles and the scene
from the official investigation. He personally viewed the accident scene several times. He
requested and reviewed discovery from the respondent including incident reports, medical
records, and BAC results. He reviewed the Bivins and Rice reports and discussed them
with the petitioner. He spoke personally about the case with Mr. Rice who answered his
questions. He had good reason to respect the professional opinion of Mr. Rice because of
prior dealings with him. He spoke personally about the case with an independent expert
who discouraged him from proceeding further. He discussed his conversations with Mr.
Rice and the independent expert with the petitioner. He told the petitioner that they could
find and retain an independent expert who would rebut Mr. Bivins and Mr. Rice if the
petitioner wanted to pay for it. He discussed the case fully with the petitioner, including
that evidence which was problematic for the defense. The petitioner told Mr. Oleson that
he did not want to retain an independent expert and that he wanted to accept the
respondent's plea offer. The decisions whether to cut Mr. Oleson's investigation short,
accept a plea agreement, and plead guilty were the petitioner's to make, not his counsel's.
Standard 4-5.2 of ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Defense Function.

II.
Even if Mr. Oleson's representation of the petitioner was constitutionally deficient, it
is hard for the respondent to fathom how there could be a reasonable probability that the
petitioner would not have pled guilty anyway based upon an objective assessment of all the
evidence in the case and his other motivations for pleading guilty. The petitioner has failed
to prove that any exculpatory evidence would have been discovered had Mr. Oleson
conducted an examination of the vehicles or their histories or had taken photographs or
measurements of them or the scene, much less that there is a reasonable probability that the
petitioner would not have pled guilty had such evidence been found. For example, the
official reconstruction reports document damage to the oil pan of Mr. Twitchell's vehicle
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and an oil trail leading from the gouges in his lane of travel to the vehicle's final resting
place. The petitioner established at trial that Mr. Oleson did not examine the vehicle or the
road way, but has failed to prove that he would have made any observations to contradict
the official reports had he done so. The petitioner also speculates that there may have been
a mechanical malfunction with one or both vehicles, or that Mr. Twitchell's lights were not
on, but he has presented no evidence that this was in fact the case.
Although the petitioner has proven that the retention of an independent
reconstructionist would have produced a modicum of potentially exculpatory evidence, he
has again failed to prove that such evidence would have objectively changed his plea. In
Baker v State, 142 Idaho 411; 128 P.3d 948 (Ct. App. 2005), the petitioner alleged that his

counsel was ineffective for failing to discover that he may have been traveling as little as
66 mph rather than the 97 mph alleged by the respondent's reconstructionist. The Court
was not convinced:
Baker must demonstrate facts in the record, which support his
assertion that he would have insisted on going to trial if he had
known about the speed estimate error. It is not disputed that Baker
had a BAC of .08, had a detectable amount of marijuana in his
blood, had been drag racing, was traveling at a speed greatly in
excess of the posted 35 mph limit, and lost control ofhis vehicle.
The State alleged that Baker committed vehicular manslaughter
either through the commission of a nonfelonious, unlawful act
committed with gross negligence or by driving under influence and
that Baker's operation of the vehicle was a significant cause
contributing to the victim's death. Even if Baker's counsel had
discovered that the accident reconstruction estimate of 97 mph was
incorrect, in light of the evidence in this case, the information that
Baker may have been traveling as little as 66 mph would not have
provided the basis for a viable defense to the charge of vehicular
manslaughter. Baker, supra.
An objective evaluation of the evidence and the other facts and circumstances

surrounding the petitioner's guilty plea fail to establish that he would probably have pled
not guilty ifhe had been armed with a report such as Mr. Jakovac's (petitioner's Exhibit 1).
Mr. Jakovac's opinion that the petitioner was traveling significantly slower and the victim
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significantly faster than stated in Mr. Rice's report has no relevance to the conclusion of the
official reconstructionists that the petitioner crossed the center line and collided with Mr.
Twitchell and is contradicted by the motorist who said that Mr. Twitchell was driving
safely and was not speeding. Mr. Jakovac's opinion that the crash occurred "near the
centerline" does little to help the petitioner since Mr. Twitchell's southbound lane is by
defmition "near the centerline" of a two-lane highway. His opinion is contradicted by the
gouges near the fogline in the southbound lane and the oil trail leading from that location to
Mr. Twitchell's vehicle as previously discussed. Virtually all the other physical evidence
on the roadway is also located in the southbound lane, including the scuff marks caused by
Mr. Twitchell's vehicle. The petitioner's vehicle was found resting in the southbound lane

south of the gouge marks and Mr. Twitchell's vehicle was found resting further south off
the southwest side of the roadway. There was virtually no physical evidence found on or
off the northbound lane. Jakovac's report is filled with speculation unsupported by any
evidence. He speculates that Mr. Twitchell "may have been cutting the corner." He
speculates that Mr. Twitchell "may have been decelerating or braking." He speculates that
there may have been a "mechanical failure" or "electrical failures." He speculates that Mr.
Twitchell's "vehicle driving lights" may not have been on, or that "there may have been a
braking malfunction." He speculates that Mr. Twitchell "may have been tired." He
speculates that the official reconstructionists were improperly motivated by a desire "to
convict a driver that was impaired from excessive alcohol consumption" and concocted
their reports accordingly. Obviously there are some major problems with Jakovac's report
and it does little to provide a viable defense to the charge of vehicular manslaughter on its
own. The petitioner paid for a report that would support his action and he got what he paid
for.
Other than the report of the independent expert, the evidence in the case and the other
facts and circumstances surrounding the petitioner's guilty plea suggest that he would
probably have entered that plea in any case . When Mr. Oleson told him that they could
obtain a report like Mr. Jakovac's if he wanted one, the petitioner told his counsel that he
did not want one because he wanted to plead guilty. If the petitioner wanted to plead guilty
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after having been told he could have such a report in hand, it is difficult to see why he
would change his mind simply because he now does indeed have it in hand. It is easy to see
why he decided to plead guilty. The official reconstructionists both concluded that he was
responsible for the crash. The physical evidence supports the conclusion that he crossed
the center line and collided with Twitchell as alleged. The petitioner asked Ryan Hill Ball
at the scene if he was the person he had hit. He told Deputy Talbot that he was "f

"

and had "really screwed up." He told Deputy Lumpkin that he had "screwed up and killed
someone." His BAC was .279. He claimed to have no recollection of the crash and so
could not truthfully contradict the overwhelming evidence against him. Under the vehicular
manslaughter statute, the respondent only had to prove that his conduct was a "significant
cause contributing to the death" of Mr. Twitchell. The respondent did not have to prove
that it was the only cause. A jury could have found him jury even if it did not believe he
crossed the centerline so long as it concluded that his extreme intoxication contributed
significantly to Mr. Twitchell's death and the petitioner stated that he did not even see Mr.
Twitchell's vehicle. (Petition, paragragh 14.) Jakovac's report acknowledges that "there
were not any visual barriers" to account for this oversight. The petitioner did not want to
pay for an independent reconstructionist. He did not want to spend any more time in the
Custer County jail and wanted to be transferred to state custody. He liked the plea
agreement Mr. Oleson had obtained for him and it offered him considerable advantages as
it committed the state to recommend a unified sentence of only six (6) years with no more
than three (3) years of that fixed rather than the fifteen (15) year maximum sentence
permitted by law. As alleged in the petition and admitted in the respondent's answer, the
petitioner was actually sentenced to a fifteen (15) year unified sentence with four (4) years
fixed.
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides that a guilty plea may be
withdrawn after sentencing only to correct a "manifest injustice." A
stricter standard is applied to a motion for plea withdrawal following
sentencing to ensure that the accused does not plead guilty merely to
test the weight of potential punishment and then withdraw the plea if
the sentence is unexpectedly severe. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho
295; 787 P.2d 281 (1990).
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Although the instant case technically involves a petition to withdraw a guilty plea because
counsel was allegedly ineffective rather than an I.C.R. 33(c) motion, the standard for
withdrawing that plea (an "unjust result") is the same and the same concerns expressed by
the Court in Carrasco, supra, apply here. The petitioner would not be seeking to withdraw
his guilty plea had he received the sentence that he expected and that the state
recommended and it is not unjust to forbid him from doing so now.

CONCLUSION
The respondent has failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence that his trial
counsel's case investigation was incompetent. Mr. Oleson had many good reasons for not
retaining an independent expert, not the least of which was that the petitioner instructed
him not to. The petitioner, not Mr. Oleson, had the right to decide whether to retain an
expert. Mr. Oleson conducted a reasonable investigation which included a review of all the
respondent's evidence, a consultation with an independent expert, and a conversation with
the respondent's expert. Mr. Oleson had no reason to question the validity of the
respondent's proposed evidence after reviewing it and speaking with the experts, and that
known evidence would not have lead a reasonable attorney to investigate further than he
did. The petitioner has also failed to prove that there is a reasonable probability that he
would not have pled guilty had Mr. Oleson retained an expert or done the other things he
now complains about. He has even failed to prove that counsel's examination of the
vehicles or their histories, or counsel's photographs or measurements of them or the scene,
would have produced any exculpatory evidence at all. The fact that he now claims that he
would not have pled guilty had counsel done more is not only self-serving but irrelevant as
well since the test is not a subjective but an objective one. An objective assessment of all
the evidence in the case and his other motivations for pleading guilty, including the plea
agreement, leads inescapably to the opposite conclusion that he would have pled guilty
anyway, particularly since Mr. Oleson advised him that he could have the kind of
independent expert's report he now has. The petitioner has tested the weight ofhis
potential punishment and found it much heavier than expected. Such is not a valid excuse
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for withdrawing his guilty plea. Justice would be ill-served by granting this petition and the
respondent respectfully requests that it be denied.
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IN Tiffi DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
MARC EDWARD KLEIN,
Petitioner.
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2012-056

PETITIONER'S CLOSING
ARGUMENT

I. INTRODUCTION
A defendant in a criminal case is guaranteed the effective assistance of counsel under
both the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 13
of the Idaho Constitution. A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, whether based upon the
state or federal constitution, is analyzed under the familiar Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984) standard. In order to prevail under Strickland, a petitioner must prove: 1) that
counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell below standards of reasonable professional
performance, and 2) that this deficient performance prejudiced the defendant. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. at 689. Deficiency is shown by demonstrating a failure of counsel to
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conduct an adequate investigation ofthe allegations. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691;

Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365,384 (1986). The prejudice prong ofthe test is shown if
there is a reasonable probability that a different result would have been obtained in the case if the
attorney had acted properly. /d. "[I]n order to satisfY the 'prejudice' requirement, the defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59
(1985). These things need only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Idaho Code § 194907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990).
As set forth below, Mr. Klein received ineffective assistance of counsel from attorney
Justin Oleson because counsel failed to independently investigate the accident or meaningfully
consult with an independent accident reconstructionist, let alone have an accident
reconstructionist even review either the Bivins Accident Reconstruction Report (Exhibit 3) or the
Rice Accident Reconstruction Report. Exhibit 2. These deficiencies unequivocally prejudiced
Mr. Klein because had counsel conducted even some investigation Mr. Klein would not have
pled guilty.

II. ARGUMENT
Reasonable professional performance requires defense counsel in a criminal case to
conduct adequate investigation of the allegations. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691; Kimmelman

v. Morrison, 4 77 U.S. 365, 3 84 ( 1986). In an attempt to provide some guidance as to what sort
of investigation is required, the Strickland Court referred to the "[p]revailing norms of practice
as reflected in American Bar Association [ABA] standards and the like" as guides for
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determining what is reasonable. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Those ABA standards require
defense counsel to:
Conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and to explore all
avenues . . . . The investigation should always include efforts to secure
information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities.
The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements
to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead
guilty.
ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, The Defense Function, Rule 4-4.1 (2d ed.l986). Here, the
evidence shows that counsel did not conduct any sort of meaningful investigation.
Counsel was retained to represent Mr. Klein sometime between the 121h and the 171h of
November, 2010. Hearing on Petition for Post-Conviction ReliefTranscript, p. 5, ln. 14- p. 6,
ln. 22. On November 12, 20 I 0, Mr. Klein was charged in Custer County with vehicular
manslaughter and excessive DUI. Id, p. 5, ln. 12- p. 8, ln. 8. These charges arose from a two
vehicle accident that occurred on November 11, 201 0, between a 1988 Toyota Pickup driven by

Mr. Klein and a 1995 Lincoln Continental driven by Jory Twitchell that occurred near mile post
118 on US 93 approximately nine (9) miles north of Mackay, Idaho. See Exhibits 1, 2, & 3.
There were no witnesses to the accident, (Hr' g Tr., p. 14,ln. 17-22) and Mr. KleiJJ. had no
recollection ofthe accident. Id., p. 46, ln. 7-12.
Counsel filed a notice of appearance on November 22, 2010, the date initially scheduled
for Mr. Klein's preliminary hearing. ld., p. 8, ln. 9- p. 8, ln. 19. This preliminary hearing was
continued and subsequently held on December 13, 2010. Id., p. 8, ln. 20- p. 9, ln. 2. At the
preliminary hearing, Corporal Allen Bivins testified regarding the accident reconstruction he had
completed on November 18,2010. ld., p. 9, ln. 23- p. 10, ln. 3; see also Exhibit 3. Because
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counsel had "a lot of concerns" about Corporal Bivins' testimony and conclusions, he and Mr.
Klein discussed and agreed that the defense should retain an independent accident
reconstructionist, but this never occurred. Id., p. 10, ln. 4- p. 11, ln. 3; p. 52, ln. 22- p. 53, ln. 3.
The matter was scheduled for a district court arraignment on December 15,2010. Id., p.
11, In. 4-16. At the arraignment, Mr. Klein entered not guilty pleas and the matter was set for a
pretrial conference on February 16, 2011, and a jury trial on March 2, 2011. Jd., p. 12, ln. 6-13.
Ultimately, at the pretrial conference on February 16, 2011, pursuant to counsel's plea
negotiations with the prosecuting attorney Mr. Klein entered an Alford plea 1 to the charge of
vehicular manslaughter. However, since being retained in mid-November 2010, coW1Sel had
done essentially nothing to investigate the circumstances surrounding the accident or consult
with an independent accident reconstructionist in any meaningful way. As more thoroughly
explained below, for more than three (3) months the only efforts made by counsel to
independently investigate the accident or retain an expert witness was a brief telephone
conversation with one accident reconstructionist, who's name he does not remember, and another
telephone conversation with Master Corporal Fred Rice, an accident reconstructionist brought on
to the case by the prosecuting attorney in an effort to rehabilitate the state's case against Mr.
Klein.
Throughout the course of the case, counsel received discovery from the prosecuting
attorney. Id., p. 12, ln. 20 - p. 14, ln. 8. This included police reports, medical records,
photographs, and other materials. Jd. It also included an accident reconstruction report
conducted by Master Corporal Fred Rice which was received either February 81h or 9th 1

4 •

Alfordv. North Carolina, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).

PETITIONER'S CLOSING ARGUMENT

232

essentially one week prior to the scheduled pretrial conference/change of plea hearing. 2 !d., p.
13, ln. 20- p. 14, ln. 8 & exhibit 2.
Besides reviewing the materials provided in discovery and a couple of telephone
conversations, counsel's independent investigation amounted to stopping at the accident scene
"at least once, maybe twice" since it happened to be along the route for counsel to appear in the
Custer County Courthouse. !d., p. 14, ln. 23 - p. 15, ln. 11. Counsel did not take pictures or
measurements ofthe accident scene. !d., p. 15, ln. 12-19. Nor did he hire anyone to take any
pictures or measurements. !d., p. 15, ln. 20-25. Because he "didn't feel a need to," counsel did
not look at or inspect either ofthe vehicles involved in the accident. !d., p. 16, ln. 1-9. Nor did
he hire anyone to do so. !d., p. 16, ln. 13-15. Counsel also failed to personally inspect or hire
anyone to inspect any of the physical evidence in the case, including the headlights and taillights
of either vehicle. /d., p. 18, ln. 8-19.
Counsel admitted he did not even research the history of the victim's vehicle, including
whether it had a history of mechanical failures or whether it was a salvaged vehicle. !d., p. 17,
ln. 6-16. Sadly, counsel was completely unaware that the victim's vehicle, a previously salvaged
vehicle (see Exhibit 4 to Dave Jakovac's Accident Reconstruction Report (Exhibit 1)) had been
sold approximately one week after the accident and was no longer in the state's possession when

Mr. Klein entered his Alford plea. !d., p. 17, ln. 25- p. 18, ln. 7.

2

Presumably, as Corporal Bivins' superior, on November 30, 2010, Fred Rice signed off
on and approved Bivins' accident reconstruction report. Exhibit 3, p. 11. Now in his own
accident reconstruction report, Fred Rice disagreed with Bivins' conclusions in numerous
respects, including such fundamental things as whether the Lincoln Continental rotated
clockwise or counter-clockwise after the collision. See Exhibits 2 & 3.
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Moreover, even though he and Mr. Klein agreed an accident reconstructionist should be
retained on December 13, 2010, following the preliminary hearing, counsel never retained one.

!d., p. 19, ln. 10-12. Counsel's efforts to retain an expert boils down to one approximately 10-15
minute conversation with an unnamed accident reconstructionist. Id., p. 19, ln. 13 - p. 20, ln. 4.
Counsel acknowledged that beyond the brief telephone conversation he did not provide anything
for the potential accident reconstructionist to review -no discovery materials, photographs,
police reports, or at the very least Bivins' and Rice's accident reconstruction reports. !d., p. 20,
ln. 5- p. 21, ln. 3. Perhaps most troubling, this one conversation with a potential expert witness
did not occur until approximately one week prior to the scheduled pretrial conference, or put
differently, approximately two months after he and Mr. Klein agreed to retain a reconstructionist.

!d., p. 21, ln. 16-18. Counsel's delay in even inquiring ofpotential case consultants is
bewildering.
Apparently, based upon counsel providing a "basic overview" of what the case was
about, this one unnamed accident reconstructionist responded that Rice was an authoritative
figure in the field of accident reconstruction and the "likelihood of anything coming out of it that
was different from Fred Rice's opinion was almost nil and nothing." !d., p. 21, ln. 4- p. 23, ln.
1. Counsel then, without much effort or diligence, conveyed to Mr. Klein that he was unable to
find anyone who would be able to refute Rice's accident reconstmction report. Exhibit 4.
Counsel also conveyed to Mr. Klein that it was counsel's personal belief that Rice is a persuasive
and believable witness. Hr'g Tr., p. 36, ln. 8- p. 37, ln. 15. However our Constitution demands
more of counsel:
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A healthy skepticism of authority, while generally advisable, is an absolute
necessity for a lawyer representing a client charged with capital murder. After all,
the custodians of authority in our democracy are ordinary people with imperfect
skills and human motivations. The duty of the defense lawyer "is to make the
adversarial testing process work in the particular case," Strickland, 466 U.S. at
690, 104 S.Ct. 2052- an obligation that cannot be shirked because of the lawyer's
unquestioning confidence in the prosecution.

Elmore v. Ozmint, 661 F.3d 783, 859 (4th Cir. 2011), as amended (Dec. 12, 2012).
A brief telephone conversation merely covering the most basic details of an accident with
only one potential expert constitutes deficient performance. Accident reconstruction requires an
expert to gather a vast array of data, evaluate and analyze the data, and then determine, based
upon accepted laws of physics and engineering, the scenario that best represents the actual
accident. Discussing an accident verbally for fifteen ( 15) minutes does not allow for a sufficient
understanding of all the critical facts, physical evidence, and variables that are needed to
objectively determine the collision cause and responsible party.
Had counsel actually consulted with an independent accident reconstructionist in a
meaningful mrumer, he and Mr. Klein would have learned Rice's accident reconstruction report
did in fact contain significant errors and its results were not supported by the physical evidence
that was documented by the Idaho State Police at the accident location. Though not exhaustive,
counsel and Mr. Klein would have learned:
-The more likely cause of the accident was due to the excessive speed of Mr. Twitchell,
whereas both Mr. Twitchell and Mr. Klein collided near the centerline of the US 93
roadway.
- Mr. Twitchell's pre-impact velocity was approximately 75-78 miles per hour and may
have been faster if Mr. Twitchell had applied the brakes but did not leave tire skid marks.
7 •
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-Fred Rice's calculations have errors of gross magnitude and employed the use of vector
analysis equations that did not apply to the accident conditions and physical constraints.
- The Idaho State Police knowingly documented and did not evaluate field evidence and
information relevant to the accident reconstruction analysis results.
- Fred Rice's accident reconstruction report was generated by using linear momentum and
vector analysis which would not be a viable application in a case where vehicles have
collided with angular acceleration causing rotation as well as the rollover event of Mr.
Twitchell's vehicle.
- Fred Rice's angle of approach for the two vehicles and the impact engagement diagram
was not utilized in the calculations consistently.
- There was not a common ordinate with 0-degrees used with the stated azimuth of
engagement between the two vehicles.
- The standard co-efficient of friction values used by Fred Rice on asphalt concrete
pavement and gravel were reduced by 50% without explanation or evidence to support
this large correction to a standard factor.
-Fred Rice's results were not supported by physical evidence that the Idaho State Police
documented at the site.
-The Idaho State Police investigation omitted evaluation of mechanical failure, electrical
failures, and did not address any need for corrective eyewear or night vision issues.
- The point or area of impact Fred Rice cited was not accurate and may be as much as 8 to
16 feet off from where the initial impact occurred.
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-The collision may have initiated near, if not within, the northbound lane- Mr. Klein's
Jane of travel.
-The apparent focus of the Idaho State Police was to convict the driver that was impaired
from excessive alcohol consumption and not an objective and thorough accident
reconstruction.

See Exhibit 1 (FJD Accident Reconstruction Report).
It must also be noted that the accident reconstruction performed by Mr. Jakovac did not
employ novel concepts or laws of physics, or overly specialized software unavailable to the state.
The Idaho State Police is a registered user ofEDC software but apparently, it was not used by
them to evaluate this accident. ld., p. 10. Instead, Rice relied upon vector and linear momentum
analysis which was an inappropriate methodology for this accident.
Similarly, it goes without saying that merely stopping at the accident scene one or two
times is a woefully inadequate investigation. Counsel did nothing to secure or inspect any of the
physical evidence in this case. Counsel's complete failure to investigate the circumstances of
this case is best exemplified by his unawareness that the state was no longer in possession of the
most important piece of physical evidence- the victim's vehicle.
As a result, Mr. Klein's plea in this case, relying upon the advice of his attorney and the
Rice Accident Reconstruction Report, cannot be considered a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent
plea. "Where, as here, a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters
his plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel's
advice was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases." Griffith v.

State, 121 Idaho 371,373, 825 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. Soto, 121 Idaho 53,
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55, 822 P.2d 572, 574 (Ct. App. 1991); and Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). Counsel
himself even confessed that his advice to Mr. Klein about whether Mr. Klein should plead guilty
or not would have been different had he been aware Rice's report contained significant errors.
!d., p. 24, ln. 20- p. 25, ln. 1. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court recently made clear

that a criminal defendant's right under the Sixth Amendment to the effective assistance of
competent counsel extends to the plea-bargaining process and in deciding whether to accept or
reject a plea offer from the state. See Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 1376 (2012); and
Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012).

The prejudice here is self-evident. Mr. Klein would not have pled guilty had he reviewed
an independent accident reconstruction report setting forth the errors in Rice's report. Hr'g Tr. p.
48, ln. 23- p. 49, ln. 15. Instead, Mr. Klein, accepting the representations made to him that there
was sufficient evidence to find him guilty at trial, entered an Alford plea to a crime he did not
recall committing and likely did not commit. Counsel advised Mr. Klein that he was unable to
"find anyone that would be credible in disputing Mr. Rice's analysis" when, in fact, Rice's
analysis contains errors of gross magnitude. The FJD Accident Reconstruction Report
unequivocally disputes Rice's analysis.

III. CONCLUSION
As shown by a preponderance of evidence and for the reasons set forth above, Mr. Klein
asks this Court to grant the petition, vacate the conviction, set the matter for a new trial and set a
reasonable bond.
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Respectfully submitted this~- day of March, 2013.

Jeffrey Brownson
Attorney for Marc Klein

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
/"~-"'

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ day of March, 2013, I caused a true and correct
copy of the foregoing document to be:
kmailed
hand delivered
faxed
to: Val Siegel, Custer County Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 630, Challis, ID 83226

~ Jeffrey Brownson·
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
MARC EDWARD KLEIN,
Case No. CV-2012-056

Petitioner,
vs.

JUDGMENT OF DISMISSAL
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

The Court having entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions, and Order, and no
issues remaining;
IT IS HEREBY ADJUDGED that the Petition in this matter is dismissed with
prejudice.
Dated this

2t.J day of March, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this;t?~ day of March, 2013, I did send a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse
mailbox; or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Jeffrey Brownson
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83 701
Val Siegel
Custer County Pros. Arty
P.O. Box 630
Challis, ID 83226
BARBARA TIERNEY
Clerk of the District Court
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
MARC EDWARD KLEIN,
Case No. CV-2012-056

Petitioner,
vs.

FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW AND ORDER

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

THIS MATTER is before the Court following an evidentiary hearing. The single
issue before the Court is whether trial counsel was ineffective in failing to present
testimony of an accident reconstructionist or otherwise properly responding to the State's
accident reconstructionists and their opinions regarding the Defendant's actions being the
cause of the subject accident. 1

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On November 11, 2010, Klein was involved in a motor vehicle accident resulting
in the death of Jory Twitchell. Klein's blood toxicology following the accident indicated
a BAC of .279. In Custer County case CR-2010-709, Klein was charged with vehicular
manslaughter and excessive driving under the influence of alcohol. An accident report
was prepared by Idaho State Police corporal Allen Bivins wherein Bivins concluded that
as the two vehicles approached each other on Highway 93 from opposite directions, Klein

1

This Court previously summarily dismissed other claims asserted by the Petitioner.
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failed to yield the right of way, and instead turned left and crossed the center line in front
of Twitchell resulting in a near head-on collision.
Bivins' report was prepared on November 18, 2010 and Bivins testified at the
preliminary hearing on December 13, 2010. Bivins' report was reviewed and approved by
Idaho State Police Officer Fred Rice, who also prepared his own report on February 2,
2011.
On February 16, 2011, the Parties entered into a plea agreement whereby Klein
would plead guilty to vehicular manslaughter and the charge of excessive DUI would be
dismissed. The State also agreed to recommend at the time of sentencing a six year
sentence: three years fixed and three years indeterminate. On February 16, 2011, Klein
entered an Alford plea of guilty to the charge of vehicular manslaughter and a Judgment
of Conviction was entered on February 22, 2011. On June 27, 2011, Klein filed a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. On August 8, 2011, the court denied the motion for
lack of jurisdiction.
II. FINDINGS OF FACT
An evidentiary hearing was held in this matter wherein the Parties produced

testimony and exhibits were admitted. Facts as determined by the Court, in addition to
those cited above, are as follows:
Trial counsel Justin Oleson was retained by Klein to represent him in the
underlying criminal action. Klein claims to have no memory of the accident and there
were no witnesses. Although Klein stated that he had no memory of the accident, he did
make incriminating statements after the accident such as he "really screwed up this time".
Exhibit 3, p. 8.
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At the time of the preliminary hearing, Corporal Allen Bivins of the Idaho State
Police testified regarding his reconstruction of the accident. Bivins has also prepared a
report. Exhibit 3. Bivins concluded that the accident was caused by Klein failing to yield
the right of way to Twitchell as Klein turned left in front of the oncoming Twitchell
vehicle resulting in a head-on collision.
Oleson had concerns about the accuracy of Bivens' conclusions and discussed
with Klein the option of retaining an accident reconstructionist to rebut the conclusions of
Bivens. Klein gave authority to Oleson to seek out an accident reconstructionist.
Following the preliminary hearing, Oleson became aware that Fred Rice of the
Idaho State Police had also performed an accident reconstruction, and Oleson received a
copy of Rice's report in the course of discovery. Exhibit 2. Discovery responses to
Oleson also included numerous photos of the accident site and the vehicles involved. In
his report, Rice also concluded that the accident was caused by Klein failing to yield the
right of way by turning in front of Twitchell, with Twitchell not having enough time to
react.
After the preliminary hearing 0 leson contacted an accident reconstructionist
where Oleson related to the reconstructionist his knowledge as to the circumstances of
the accident and the opposing expert testimony. While Oleson does not recall whether
they specifically reviewed Rice's fmdings, they did at least discuss Rice's credentials and
experience. Oleson was essentially advised that Rice had significant qualifications and
experience and that it would be very difficult to rebut his conclusions. Oleson also had
prior experience with Rice on a prior unrelated matter wherein Oleson believed that Rice
made a very good witness when testifying before a jury.
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At one point, Oleson had a telephone conference with Rice wherein they
discussed Biven's report and Rice's opinions regarding the accident. In the telephone
conference, Oleson raised the issues and concerns he had when he first became aware of
Biven's conclusions. In Oleson's mind, Rice was able to provide good explanations as to
the conclusions ofthe officers.
Oleson then discussed with Klein his telephone call with an accident
reconstructionist, the telephone call with Rice, and Oleson's prior observations of Rice
testifying in a trial. Particularly, Oleson related that it was the opinion of the accident
, reconstructionist that it would be very difficult to refute Rice's conclusions. Oleson,
however, also told Klein that based on his experience with expert witnesses, they still
could probably find an expert witness who would be willing to refute Rice and Biven's
conclusions if Klein was willing to pay for it.
Oleson and Klein discussed whether it made fmancial sense to hire an accident
reconstructionist under the circumstances, the likelihood of prevailing at trial, and the
weaknesses of the case e.g., the blood alcohol level, Klein's lack of memory, and the two
expert witnesses who would testify that Klein crossed the center line while failing to
yield. Klein expressed that he was tired of the Custer County jail and felt that he had no
defenses. Klein ultimately determined not to hire a reconstructionist and to accept the
plea agreement offered by the prosecutor. This decision was later confirmed in a letter
from Oleson to Klein. Exhibit 4.
As part of Klein's claim in this matter, Klein has provided the report of an expert
witness/accident reconstructionist who does in fact refute the conclusions of Bivens and
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Rice and concluded that" ... the more likely cause of the accident was due to excessive
speed ofV2 [Twitchell] ... "Exhibit 1.

III. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
In a post-conviction proceeding, the petitioner bears the burden of proving the
allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. I.C. § 19-4907; Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho
865, 801 P.2d 1216 (1990). As the trier of fact, the district court determines the
credibility of the witnesses, the weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences
to be drawn from the evidence. Larkin v. State, 115 Idaho 72, 73, 764 P.2d 439, 440
(Ct.App.1988). A factual finding is clearly erroneous only if it is not supported by
"substantial and competent evidence in the record." Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 813,
907 P.2d 783, 790 (1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1234, 116 S.Ct. 1877, 135 L.Ed.2d 173
(1996).
As to claims based upon an alleged ineffective assistance of counsel, the
petitioner bears the burden of proving that (1) the attorney was incompetent and/or his or
her conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (2) that but for the
incompetence, there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial would have
been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Fodge v. State, 125
Idaho 882, 876 P.2d 164 (App. 1994). When a conviction is the result of a plea, the
petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's alleged
errors, petitioner would not have pleaded guilty but would have insisted on going to trial.

Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366,370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203,210 (1985).
Latitude is given to trial counsel as to tactical and strategic decisions. Gonzales v.

State, 151 Idaho 168, 2254 P.3d 69 (App. 2011). Similarly, what may turn out to be a
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faulty evaluation of evidence and recommendation to plead guilty does not by itself
establish ineffective assistance of counsel.
"The longstanding test for determining the validity of a guilty plea is
'whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the
alternative courses of action open to the defendant.' "Hill v. Lockhart,
474 U.S. 52, 56, 106 S.Ct. 366, 369, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 208 (1985). "Where
... a defendant is represented by counsel during the plea process and enters
a plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on
whether counsel's advice 'was within the range of competence demanded
of attorneys in criminal cases.' " Id (citation omitted). Strategic or tactical
decisions made by counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless
those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant
law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Gilpin-Grubb,
138 Idaho at 81, 57 P.3d at 792.

***
The United States Supreme Court has stated,
[T]he decision to plead guilty before the evidence is in frequently
involves the making of difficult judgments. All the pertinent facts
normally cannot be known unless witnesses are examined and
cross-examined in court. Even then the truth will often be in
dispute. In the face of unavoidable uncertainty, the defendant and
his counsel must make their best judgment as to the weight of the
State's case. Counsel must predict how the facts, as he understands
them, would be viewed by a court. If proved would those facts
convince a judge or jury ofthe defendant's guilt? ... Questions like
these cannot be answered with certitude; yet a decision to plead
guilty must necessarily rest upon counsel's answers, uncertain as
they may be. Waiving trial entails the inherent risk that the goodfaith evaluations of a reasonably competent attorney will turn out
to be mistaken either as to the facts or as what a court's judgment
might be on given facts. That a guilty plea must be intelligently
made is not a requirement that all advice offered by the defendant's
lawyer withstand retrospective examination in a post-conviction
hearing.

McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 769-70, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 1448, 25
L.Ed.2d 763, 772-73 (1970) (citing Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742,
756-57, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1473-74, 25 L.Ed.2d 747, 760-61 (1970)).
Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 60-61, 106 P.3d 376, 386-87 (2004).
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First, in consideration of the evidence, the Court finds that trial counsel's conduct
did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness. Counsel's analysis of the
State's accident reconstruction reports and the other evidence against Klein was
reasonable. While it was ultimately Klein's decision on whether to hire an accident
reconstructionist, counsel's explanation to Klein regarding the evidence and the utility of
obtaining rebuttal expert testimony was reasonable. For example, Klein had to consider
how many accident reconstructionists he would have to retain and how much money he
would have to spend before finding a reconstructionist who would provide favorable
testimony. Klein would then have to consider whether that favorable testimony would be
sufficient to create a reasonable doubt in view of the evidence against him.
There was nothing deficient in Oleson reporting to Klein his findings regarding
Bivens' and Rice's opinions. Oleson remained willing to try to locate a favorable
reconstructionist if that was Klein's desire. Again, it is this Court's opinion that Oleson's
conduct did not fall below an objective standard.
While Petitioner takes issue with Oleson's alleged failure to personally
investigate the accident, this Court fails to see the relevance of such an alleged failure.
Oleson was not an engineer or accident reconstructionist and would not be a witness in
the case. Oleson could certainly familiarize himselfwith the nature of the accident
through photos and reports produced in discovery. Oleson's personal investigation of the
vehicles and accident site are immaterial.
In addition to the foregoing, even if trial counsel was ineffective in obtaining
rebuttal expert testimony, this Court does not believe that but for the alleged deficient
performance, Klein would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on proceeding
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with trial. It is the Court's opinion that Klein's extremely high blood alcohol level is
compelling evidence. That blood alcohol level combined with incriminating statements
and the analysis of two accident reconstructionists presents an extremely strong case on
the part of the State. Klein was aware of this evidence. As part of the plea agreement,
Klein had the opportunity to have the charge of excessive DUI dismissed and receive a
preferred sentencing recommendation from the state. Even with rebuttal testimony from
an opposing accident reconstructionist, it is not a reasonable probability that Klein would
not have pleaded guilty. Again, Klein was advised by Oleson that such opposing
testimony could be located if he was willing to pay the necessary funds. Nevertheless,
Klein chose to plead guilty.
Accordingly, this Court concludes that Klein has failed to establish deficient
performance by trial counsel or resulting prejudice under Strickland. This Court having
previously dismissed other claims asserted by Klein, and no other claims remaining,
Klein's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief will be dismissed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated this

2RJ

day of March, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this;))~ day of March, 2013, I did send a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document upon the parties listed below by mailing, with the
correct postage thereon; by causing the same to be placed in the respective courthouse
mailbox; or by causing the same to be hand-delivered.
Jeffrey Brownson
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
Val Siegel
Custer County Pros. Atty
P.O. Box 630
Challis, ID 83226
BARBARA TIERNEY
Clerk of the District Court
Custer County, Idaho
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Jeffrey Brownson
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NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY & BARTLETT LLP
303 W. Bannock
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83 701
Phone: (208) 343-1000
ibrownson@nmblaw.com
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Attorneys for Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER
MARC EDWARD KLEIN,
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Resondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV-2012-056

NOTICE OF APPEAL
(Post-Conviction)

TO: THE ABOVE NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND ITS
ATTORNEYS, THE CUSTER COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, THE CLERK OF
THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT, CLERK OF THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
COURT REPORTERS:
1. The Appellant Marc Klein appeals against the above named Respondent State of Idaho
to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment of Dismissal filed in the above entitled action on
March 20, 2013, by the Honorable Joel E. Tingey, District Judge of the Seventh Judicial District.
2. Mr. Klein has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the orders described
in paragraph 1, above, are appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11(a)(1-8), I.A.R.
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3. A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal which the Appellant intends to assert
in the appeal is as follows:
a)

Whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Klein's
petition for post-conviction relief in part and finding that Mr. Klein's
constitutional right to due process was not violated when the prosecuting
attorney failed to disclose impeachment evidence regarding the credibility
and reliability of Fred Rice.

b)

Whether the district court erred in summarily dismissing Mr. Klein's
petition for post-conviction relief in part and finding that Mr. Klein did not
receive ineffective assistance of counsel when defense counsel failed to
timely file a motion to withdraw Mr. Klein's guilty plea.

c)

Whether the district court erred in dismissing Mr. Klein's petition for postconviction relief in part following an evidentiary hearing and finding that
Mr. Klein did not receive ineffective assistance of counsel when defense
counsel failed to independently investigate the accident or meaningfully
consult with an independent accident reconstructionist.

4. No portion of the record is sealed.
5. The Appellant requests the preparation of the following portions of the reporter's
transcript in electronic format pursuant to Rule 25(a), I.A.R.:
a)

The motion for summary disposition hearing held on July 18, 2012; and

b)

The evidentiary hearing held on February 15, 2013 (previously prepared).
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6. In addition to the standard record under Rule 28(b)(1 ), I.A.R., the Appellant requests
the clerk's record include these additional documents:
a)

Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief filed on April 19, 2012;

b)

Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition filed on June 18, 2012;

c)

Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition
filed on June 18, 2012;

d)

Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary
Disposition and in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary
Disposition filed on July 5, 2012;

e)

Affidavit of Val Siegel in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary
Disposition and in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary
Disposition filed on July 5, 2012;

f)

Affidavit ofVal Siegel Re: Summary of Plea Change Hearing filed on July
5, 2012;

g)

Petitioner's Reply to State's Motion for Summary Disposition and
Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition filed on July
11, 2012;

h)

Second Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson in Support of Petition for PostConviction Relief filed on July 11, 2012;

i)

Notice of Filing Exhibits filed on July 26, 2012;
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j)

Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment,
Summary Judgment filed on August 15, 2012;

k)

Respondent's Post-Trial Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for PostConviction Relief filed on March 8, 2013; and

1)

Petitioner's Closing Argument filed on March 8, 2013.

7. The Appellant requests the following documents admitted as exhibits be copied and
sent to the Supreme Court:
a)

Exhibits admitted at the evidentiary hearing held on February 15, 2013:
1. FDJ Accident Reconstruction Report;
2. Rice Accident Reconstruction Report;
3. Bivins Accident Reconstruction Report; and
4. Letter from Justin Oleson to Marc Klein dated February 22, 2011.

8. I certify:
a)

That a copy of this notice of appeal has been served on each reporter of
whom a transcript has been requested as named below at the addresses set
out below:
1. Jack L. Fuller, Bonneville County Courthouse,
605 N. Capital Avenue, Idaho Falls, ID 83402.

b)

That the court reporter of the district, Jack L. Fuller, has been paid the
estimated fee for preparation of the reporter's transcript.

c)

That the estimated fee for preparation of the clerk's record has been paid.

d)

That there is no fee for an appeal in a post-conviction case.

e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant
to I.A.R. 20, and the Attorney General ofidaho pursuant to§ 67-1401(1),
Idaho Code.

4- NOTICE OF APPEAL
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Respectfully submitted this

_.Q'l day of April, 2013.

i!?r=
~wnson
ill

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I CERTIFY that on April.Qi, 2013, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
document to be:

hand delivered
faxed
to:
1) Jack L. Fuller, Bonneville County Courthouse, 605 N. Capital Avenue, Idaho Falls, ID 83402
2) Custer County Prosecuting Attorney, P.O. Box 630, Challis, ID 83226
3) Clerk ofthe Supreme Court, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0101
4) Lawrence G. Wasden, Idaho Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010
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Official Court Reporter
' ., APR 23 PH
Seventh Judicial District201J ,...,
Bonneville County Courthouse
605 N Capital Ave
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83402
(208) 529-1350 Ext. 1138
E-Mail: jfuller@co.bonneville.id.us
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********************************************************
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED

********************************************************
DATE:
TO:

April 22,

2013

Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk of the Court
Supreme Court I Court of Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101

SUPREME COURT DOCKET NO:
DISTRICT COURT CASE NO:
CAPTION OF CASE:

40924
CV-2012-56

(Custer County)

Marc Edward Klein vs.

State of Idaho

You are hereby notified that a reporter's appellate
transcript in the above-entitled and numbered case has
been placed in the mail to the District Court Clerk of
the County of Custer in the Seventh Judicial District.
Said transcript consists of the following proceedings,
totaling 112 pages:
1.
Relief 2012)
2.
Relief -

Hearing on Petition for Post-Conviction
Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (July 18,
Hearing on Petition for Post-Conviction
Evidentiary Hearing (February 15, 2013)

Respectfully,

~

----~--'1---~-~-------JACK L. FULLER
Idaho CSR #762
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Date: 5/22/2013

User: LAlLA

Seventh Judicial District Court - Custer

Time: 01:58PM

ROAReport

Page 1 of4

Case: CV-2012-0000056 Current Judge: Joel E Tingey
Marc Edward Klein, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Marc Edward Klein, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

4/19/2012

NCPC

RUTH

New Case Filed - Post Conviction Releif

APER

RUTH

Subject: Klein, Marc Edward Appearance Jeffrey Joel E Tingey
Brownson Esq

APER

RUTH

Other party: State Of Idaho Appearance Val
Siegel (County) Esq

Joel E Tingey

RUTH

Filing: H10- Post-conviction act proceedings
Paid by: Klein, Marc Edward (subject) Receipt
number: 0000492 Dated: 4/19/2012 Amount:
$.00 (Cash) For: Klein, Marc Edward (subject)

Joel E Tingey

PETN

RUTH

Verified Petition For Post Conviction Relief

Joel E Tingey

MOTN

RUTH

Motion for Judicial Justice

Joel E Tingey

AFFD

RUTH

Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson in Support of
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Joel E Tingey

5/18/2012

ANSW

LAlLA

Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief;
Motion for Summary Disposition

Joel E Tingey

6/8/2012

REQT

RUTH

Request For Status Conference and Scheduling Joel E Tingey
Order

6/11/2012

HRSC

RUTH

Hearing Scheduled (Status 07/18/2012 02:00
PM)

Joel E Tingey

6/18/2012

MOTN

RUTH

Petitioner's Motion For Summary Judgment

Joel E Tingey

MEMO

RUTH

Memorandum In Support of Petitioner's Motion for Joel E Tingey
Summary Disposition

NOHG

RUTH

Notice Of Hearing (Motion for Summary
Disposition 7/18/12 2:00PM))

Joel E Tingey

AFFD

RUTH

Affidavit Of Val Siegel In Support Of
Respondent's Motion For Summary Disposition
and In Opposition To Petitioner's Motion for
Summary Disposition

Joel E Tingey

MEMO

RUTH

Memorandum In Support of Respondent's Motion Joel E Tingey
For Summary Disposition and in Opposition to
Petitioner's Motion For Summary Disposition

AFFD

RUTH

Affidavit Of Val Siegel Re: Summary of Plea
Change Hearing

Joel E Tingey

MISC

RUTH

Letter requesting Petitioner to attend hearing
telephonically

Joel E Tingey

REPL

RUTH

Petitioner's Reply To State's Motion For Summary Joel E Tingey
Disposition and Opposition to Petitioner's Motion
For Summary Disposition

AFFD

RUTH

Second Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson In Support
of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

HRHD

RUTH

Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Joel E Tingey
scheduled on 07/18/2012 02:00PM: Hearing
Held Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition

7/5/2012

7/11/2012

7/18/2012

State's Motion for Summary Disposition
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Joel E Tingey

Joel E Tingey
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Page 2 of 4

Case: CV-2012-0000056 Current Judge: Joel E Tingey
Marc Edward Klein, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Marc Edward Klein, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Judge

Date

Code

User

7/19/2012

CMIN

RUTH

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Disposition
Hearing date: 7/18/2012
Time: 2:00pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter:
Minutes Clerk: Ruth Brunker
Tape Number:

Joel E Tingey

MINE

RUTH

Minute Entry

Joel E Tingey

7/25/2012

LAlLA

Miscellaneous Payment: Copy Of Tape Paid by: Joel E Tingey
Dennis Benjamin Trust Account Receipt number:
0000987 Dated: 7/25/2012 Amount: $10.00
(Check)

7/26/2012

LAlLA

Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Joel E Tingey
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by:
Dennis Benjamin Trust Account Receipt number:
0000992 Dated: 7/26/2012 Amount: $15.00
(Check)

LAlLA

Miscellaneous Payment: Fax Fee Paid by: Dennis Joel E Tingey
Benjamin Trust Account Receipt number:
0000992 Dated: 7/26/2012 Amount: $15.00
(Check)

NOTC

LAlLA

Notice of Filing of Exhibits - J 1 - J 18

8/15/2012

MEMO

RUTH

Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion For Joel E Tingey
Summary Judgment, Summary Judgment

9/18/2012

MOTN

RUTH

Petitioner's Motion For Permission to Conduct
Discovery

HRSC

RUTH

Joel E Tingey
Hearing Scheduled (Motion 10/17/2012 02:30
PM) Motion for Permission to Conduct Discovery

NOHR

LAlLA

Notice Of Hearing

Joel E Tingey

MOTN

LAlLA

Motion for Counsel to Appear by Telephone at
Hearing

Joel E Tingey

ORDR

LAlLA

Order Granting Petitioner's Motion for Permission Joel E Tingey
to Conduct Discovery

HRVC

LAlLA

Hearing result for Motion scheduled on
Joel E Tingey
10/17/2012 02:30PM: Hearing Vacated Motion
for Permission to Conduct Discovery

10/17/2012

NOTD

RUTH

Notice Of Taking Deposition

Joel E Tingey

12/17/2012

HRSC

RUTH

Hearing Scheduled (Status 12/19/2012 03:15
PM) Brownson - tele

Joel E Tingey

NOTC

RUTH

Notice of Telephonic Status Conference
Regarding Evidentiary Hearing

Joel E Tingey

HRHD

RUTH

Joel E Tingey
Hearing result for Status scheduled on
12/19/2012 03:15PM: Hearing Held Brownson tele

9/21/2012

9/24/2012

12/27/2012
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Joel E Tingey

Joel E Tingey

Date: 5/22/2013
Time: 02:00 PM
Page 3 of4

User: LAlLA

Seventh Judicial District Court - Custer Cou
ROAReport
Case: CV-2012-0000056 Current Judge: Joel E Tingey
Marc Edward Klein, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Marc Edward Klein, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

12/27/2012

CMIN

RUTH

Court Minutes
Hearing type: Status
Hearing date: 12/19/2012
Time: 3:15 pm
Courtroom:
Court reporter: Jack Fuller
Minutes Clerk: Ruth Brunker
Tape Number:
Val Sigel
Jeffrey Brownsen

Joel E Tingey

MINE

RUTH

Minute Entry

Joel E Tingey

1/3/2013

HRSC

RUTH

Hearing Scheduled (Status 01/08/2013 11:00
AM) Bonneville Chambers

Joel E Tingey

1/8/2013

AFFD

RUTH

Affidavit

Joel E Tingey

1/9/2013

DOS I

RUTH

Summons: Document Service Issued: on
1/9/2013 to Marc Edward Klein; Assigned to.
Service Fee of $0.00. Justin Oleson

Joel E Tingey

1/10/2013

HRHD

RUTH

Hearing result for Status scheduled on
Joel E Tingey
01/08/2013 11:00 AM: Hearing Held Bonneville
Chambers

HRSC

RUTH

Hearing Scheduled (Court Trial 02/15/2013
10:00 AM) In Bonneville

Joel E Tingey

RUTH

Notice Of Hearing

Joel E Tingey

1/11/2013

Judge

HRSC

LAlLA

Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled
02/15/2013 10:00 AM) Post-Conviction
Evidentiary

Joel E Tingey

NOHR

LAlLA

Notice Of Hearing

Joel E Tingey

MOTN

RUTH

Motion For Transport

Joel E Tingey

ORDR

RUTH

Order For Transport

Joel E Tingey

2/15/2013

HRHD

LAlLA

Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled scheduled
on 02/15/2013 10:00 AM: Hearing Held
Post-Conviction Evidentiary - Bonneville

Joel E Tingey

3/8/2013

NOTC

LAlLA

Notice of Filing

Joel E Tingey

MEMO

LAlLA

Respondent's Post-Trial Memorandum in
Opposition to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

Joel E Tingey

MISC

LAlLA

Petitioner's Closing Argument

Joel E Tingey

FIND

DE NAY

Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law And
Order

Joel E Tingey

JDMT

DE NAY

Judgment of Dismissal

Joel E Tingey

DOSN

DE NAY

Summons: Document Returned Not Served on
3/20/2013 to Marc Edward Klein; Assigned to .
Service Fee of $0.00.

Joel E Tingey

CD IS

DE NAY

Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho,
Other Party; Klein, Marc Edward, Subject. Filing
date: 3/20/2013

Joel E Tingey

STAT

DE NAY

STATUS CHANGED: Closed
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Joel E Tingey
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3/20/2013

Date: 5/22/2013
Time: 01:58 PM
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Seventh Judicial District Court - Custer Cou
ROA Report
Case: CV-2012-0000056 Current Judge: Joel E Tingey
Marc Edward Klein, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Marc Edward Klein, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

Judge

4/8/2013

APSC

DE NAY

Appealed To The Supreme Court

Joel E Tingey

STAT

DE NAY

STATUS CHANGED: Inactive

Joel E Tingey

NOTC

DE NAY

Notice of Appeal

Joel E Tingey

BONT

DE NAY

Bond Posted for Clerks Record( Receipt 439
Dated 4/8/2013 for 100.00)

Joel E Tingey

LAlLA

Filing: L4a - Appeal - Post Conviction Relief
Paid by: Brownson, Jeffrey Esq (attorney for
Klein, Marc Edward) Receipt number: 0000657
Dated: 5/21/2013 Amount: $.00 (Cash) For:
Klein, Marc Edward (subject)

Joel E Tingey

4/9/2013

CCOA

DE NAY

Clerk's Certificate Of Appeal

Joel E Tingey

4/23/2013

ORDR

LAlLA

Order Returning Defendant

Joel E Tingey

NOTC

LAlLA

Notice of Transcript Lodged

Joel E Tingey

5/9/2013

MISC

DE NAY

Certificate of Exhibits

Joel E Tingey

5/22/2013

NOTC

LAlLA

Notice of Lodging of Clerk's Record

Joel E Tingey

CERS

LAlLA

Certificate Of Service

Joel E Tingey
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL

DISTidbtist.RtEPH

OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER

Marc Edward Klein,
Petitioner/Appellant,
-vsState of Idaho,
Respondent/Respondent,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Supreme Court No. 40924
Custer County No. CV-2012-56
NOTICE OF LODGING OF
CLERK'S RECORD

)

Notice is hereby given that on May 22nd, 2013, the Clerk's Record was lodged
with the District Court Clerk in the above referenced appeal.
You are hereby notified that the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript for the
above-entitled matter have been lodged with the Court. Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule
29(a), the parties shall have twenty-eight (28) days from the date of service of the
transcript and the record to request corrections, additions, or deletions, together with a
Notice of Hearing with the District Court. In the event no objections to the Reporter's
Transcript or Clerk's Record are filed within said 28-day time period, the transcript and
record shall be deemed settled, in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 29(a).
DATED this 22nd day ofMay, 2013.

Cc: Clerk of the Court
Idaho Supreme Court
PO Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0101
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CUSTER

MARC EDWARD KLEIN,
Petitioner/Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Defendant/Appellant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

SUPREME COURT NO. 40924
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, BARBARA C. TIERNEY, Clerk of the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District of
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Custer, do hereby certifY that I have personally served or
mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, one copy of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's
Transcript to each of the parties or their Attorney of Record, this 22nd day of May, 2013, as follows:

JEFFREY BROWNSON, ESQ.
POBox2772
Boise, ID 83701

LAWRENCE G WASDEN, ESQ.
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

BARBARA C TIERNEY

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
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Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief {Filed 04/1912012)--23-116
Affidavit of Val Siegel in Support of Summary Disposition and in Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for
Summary Disposition (Filed 0710512012 )--------------------------------------------------------------------------148-180
Affidavit of Val Siegel Re: Summary of Plea Change Hearing {Filed 07105/2012)------------------------181-184
Answer to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief; Motion for Summary Judgment
{Filed OSI 1812 012 )------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------117 -124
Certificate of Service {Filed OSI 2212 013) --------------------------------------------------------------------------------2 62
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order {Filed 0312012013)----------------------------------------242-250
Judgment of Dismiss aI {Filed03I20I2013 )-------------------------------------------------------------------------240-241
Memorandum Decision and Order on Motion for Summary Judgment Summary Dismissal
{Filed 0811512012 )-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------204-217
Memorandum in Support of Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition {Filed 0611812012)-----127-137
Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion for Summary Disposition and in Opposition to the
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment (Filed 07IOSI2012)--------------------------------------------138-147
Notice of Ap pea I {Filed 0410812013 )--------------------------------------------------------------------------------2 51-255
Notice of Filing Exhibits {Filed 0712612012 )-----------------------------------------------------------------------201-203
Notice of Lodging of Clerk's Record {Filed 0512212013)--------------------------------------------------------------261
Notice of Tra nscript Lodged-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------2 56
Petitioner's Closing Argument (Filed 0310812013 )--------------------------------------------------------------229-23 9
Petitioner's Motion for Summary Disposition {Filed 0611812012)-------------------------------------------125-126
Petitioner's Reply to State's Motion for Summary Disposition and Opposition to Petitioner's Motion for
Summary Disposition (Filed 0711112012 )--------------------------------------------------------------------------185-189
Register of Actions-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------257-2 60
Respondent's Post-Trial Memorandum in Opposition to Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(Filed 0310812013 )-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------218-2 28

Second Affidavit of Jeffrey Brownson in Support of Petition for Post-Conviction Relief
(Filed 07/11/2012 )-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------190-200
Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief (Filed 04/19/2012)---------------------------------------------------1-22

